Abstract

The thesis *Existential Dimensions of Corporeality from a Phenomenological Perspective* examines the significance of corporeality for human existence, starting from the premise that the body is a fundamental dimension of human being. The primary aim of this study is to provide a phenomenological description and systematic elucidation of the existential dimensions of embodiment through an analysis of three phenomena: birth, life, and death. Its purpose is to offer a comprehensive account of the way in which embodied experience constitutes the human being's relation to themselves, to others, and to the world. Particular emphasis is placed on the first-person experience of lived embodiment (Ger. *Leib*/Fr. *chair*).

The first object of inquiry is birth as a fundamental phenomenon of embodied existence. This phenomenon is described from three perspectives: "birth in the world'', "birth for the world'' and "one's own birth''. The analysis shows that birth is not merely the biological beginning of life, but an event that constitutes the emergence of an individual embodied subject in the world. At the same time, birth marks a moment of human individuation and autonomisation, as well as the beginning of one's relations with others and with a particular cultural reality. The analysis of birth thus leads to the conclusion that embodiment is not only the condition of the human being's emergence into the world, but also the basis for the constitution of their identity and autonomy.

A further central problem addressed in the dissertation is the significance of embodiment for the phenomenon of life. The body is understood in the study as a living, self-experiencing incarnation, in contrast to a reductionist conception of the body as merely a biological organism. In particular, the analyses of the works of Michel Henry and Renaud Barbaras make it possible to identify two complementary ways of understanding this experience. For Henry, lived embodiment is the locus of the primordial, affective self-experience of life, independent of its relation to the external world. For Barbaras, by contrast, the body is constituted through openness to the world, movement, perception, and desire. Bringing these perspectives together makes it possible to show that embodiment is both an immanent experience grounded in self-affection as well as a dynamic relation to the world. The body is thus revealed as a condition of the possibility of experience, subjectivity, and human being-in-the-world.

The third aim of the study is a phenomenological analysis of the embodied dimension of death, understood as an existential phenomenon characterised by inevitability, irreversibility, and necessity. The analysis addresses its temporality, the experience of another

person's death, and the phenomenon of one's own death. It also examines, in relation to the death of another, the related issues of victimhood, euthanasia, suicide, and the death penalty. This analysis showes how the experience of death affects embodiment, freedom, responsibility, relations with others, and the meaning of life. Of particular importance is the fact that one's own death remains inaccessible as a direct experience, while awareness of its inevitability and the experience of others' deaths shape the way one can experiences one's own existence.

The most significant contribution of the dissertation is the theoretical connection between birth, life, and death through the original category of "foundational phenomena". Unlike, for example, Heideggerian existentialia, understood as enduring structures of human being-in-the-world, foundational phenomena refer to concrete, finite, limit events that constitute the possibility of subsequent experience. Birth and death are thus understood as events that found human existence: the former marks the human being's entry into the world, while the latter marks the limit of all phenomenalisation. Both phenomena share the structure of an event: they are unpredictable, beyond a human being's complete control, and exceed its capacity for direct experience.

The research thus enables the dissertation to achieve its primary aim: to describe embodiment as a fundamental dimension of human existence and as the principle connecting birth, life, and death. The original contribution of the study is the proposed category of "foundational phenomena", which extends classical phenomenology of existence by addressing the events that constitute human life from its beginning to its end. Central to this proposal is the emphasis on the embodied character of experience. Both birth and death always concern a concrete, embodied subject who experiences themselves and the world through their own embodiment. Ultimately, existence is understood as "stretched" between two foundational phenomena, birth and death, while life appears as an embodied, temporal, and dynamic experience unfolding between these limits.

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